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Abstract
This paper explores the role of savings groups in resilience to urban climate-related 
disasters. Savings groups are a rapidly growing phenomenon in Africa. They are 
decentralized, non-institutional groups that provide millions of people excluded 
from the formal banking sector with a trusted, accessible, and relatively simple 
source of microfinance. Yet there is little work on the impacts of savings groups on 
resilience to disasters. In this paper, we use a combination of quantitative and quali-
tative evidence from Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) to shed new light on the role that 
savings groups play in helping households cope with climate-related shocks. Draw-
ing on new data, we show that approximately one-quarter of households have at least 
one member in a group, and that these households recover from flood events faster 
than those who do not. We further argue that the structure of savings groups allows 
for considerable group oversight, reducing the high costs of monitoring and sanc-
tioning that often undermine cooperative engagement in urban areas. This makes 
the savings group model a uniquely flexible form of financing that is well adapted to 
helping households cope with shocks such as repeated flooding. In addition to this, 
we posit that they may provide a foundation for community initiatives focusing on 
preventative action.
Keywords Savings groups · Floods · Dar es Salaam · Resilience · Recovery 
financing · Disaster prevention
Introduction
Fatima was at work when flood waters swept away her young son. According to 
the Tanzania Meteorological Agency, the 2011 rains had been the heaviest since 
the country’s independence in 1961. Across Dar es Salaam roads were inundated, 
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bridges destroyed, and hundreds were left homeless. Over 5000 people were dis-
placed and at least 43 lost their lives (Anande & Luhunga, 2019). Thankfully, Fati-
ma’s son was not one of them. A neighbor had spotted the injured boy and quickly 
pulled him from the fetid water. Medical attention was crucial, but the hospital was 
far away. It was at this point that Fatima’s neighbor drew upon a common resource 
for residents of Dar es Salaam. Fatima explained that her neighbor “was part of my 
savings group… [so] she was able to get emergency cash from our group to pay for a 
Bajaj [a three-wheeled motorcycle taxi] to the hospital. It saved my son’s life.”
All over the world, people like Fatima turn to their neighbors and friends when disas-
ter strikes. Community members are often the first—and sometimes the only—respond-
ers. Adapting and recovering from climate-related shocks often rests on being able to 
draw on social networks, local engagement, and community identity and attachment 
(Elias-Trostmann et al., 2018). This is part of the idea of “community resilience” cham-
pioned by international aid organizations and national governments as a key complement 
to existing efforts to strengthen top-down disaster management policies (Dickson et al., 
2012; Global Disaster Preparedness Center, 2019; Gupte, 2019). While the boundaries 
and usefulness of the notion of “resilience” remain debated (Manyena, 2006), it remains 
clear that collective action can help people after disasters and can help address chal-
lenges that exacerbate flood risks. Yet collective action is not automatic. Among other 
things, it requires the capacity for people to monitor and sanction each other’s behavior 
to prevent beneficiaries from free-riding (Fafchamps, 1992; Ostrom, 2005).
The literature describes collective action, coordination, and cooperation as more 
difficult in urban settings where social relations are typically more fragmented than 
in rural areas (Baland & Platteau, 2000; Ellickson, 1991). Cities tend to be large, 
anonymous places, and urban residents frequently move. In Dar es Salaam, 57% of 
households are renters who on average have lived in their current accommodation for 
less than 4 years (Panman & Lozano-Gracia, 2021). Understanding bottom-up col-
lective action in the face of disasters in this context is crucial for two reasons. First, 
urban dwellers in East Africa are among the most exposed populations to disaster 
risk in the world (Adelekan et al., 2015; IPCC, 2012), while the poor and women are 
particularly vulnerable (Neumayer & Plümper, 2007; Simon, 2010). Second, rapid 
urbanization has left many governments on the back foot, unable to adequately react 
to disasters and adapt to risks in line with the pace of anthropogenic climate change.
In this paper we look at the role that savings groups play in helping people cope 
with the repeated risks of flooding. Savings groups were principally conceived as 
vehicles to increase financial inclusion and support entrepreneurship and employment 
(Smith & Scott, 2015). However, studies have also begun to explore how savings 
group members are often drawn to groups as a means of dealing with emergencies 
(Beaman et al., 2014; Gash & Odell, 2013; Jahns, 2014). In line with this literature, 
we posit that groups have a positive effect through two interconnected channels.
First, by providing access to emergency funds and encouraging people to save 
throughout the year, savings groups give households the financial means to react to 
flood damage. We find that member households are 12% more likely to have recov-
ered from past flood events. Such households appear better able to smooth their con-
sumption across the year by purchasing emergency supplies and investing in post-flood 
repairs without cutting back on vital expenditures (Gash & Odell, 2013).
1 3
Saving Up for a Rainy Day? Savings Groups and Resilience to…
Second, savings groups foster the social ties and engagement necessary for collec-
tive action during disasters. Many NGOs anticipate that savings groups can engen-
der “social cohesion, solidarity, and mutual aid” (Allen & Panetta, 2010, 12) or even 
“humility, trust, loyalty, assistance to the vulnerable, support for each other in times 
of need, and renewed belief in group activities by group members” (Odera & Muruka, 
2007, v). Membership may also boost social capital in the community as it demon-
strates a willingness for cooperation and sharing, giving members both social and eco-
nomic advantages (Rodima-Taylor, 2012). We find evidence to support the assertion 
that group membership has a positive impact on these dynamics. Households with 
members in savings groups also tend to have larger social networks, and respondents 
often highlighted how their groups helped them expand and strengthen their social 
networks. We also find an indirect effect of belonging to a group. Savings groups are 
an effective means of providing financing for people living in highly precarious envi-
ronments due to the ease with which members can monitor and sanction each other’s 
behavior. The extensive knowledge group members have of each other’s situations 
allows a degree of flexibility into lending practices that would not be sustainable in 
more formal institutional contexts, such as a bank or microcredit institution. For the 
same reason, we also argue that groups could potentially facilitate collective action for 
broader flood prevention activities.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to look specifically at the relationship between 
savings group membership and resilience to urban flooding. In bringing together the lit-
erature on savings groups and urban resilience, this paper contributes new insights and 
raises new questions. We contribute to the literature on savings groups with data on the 
extent of group membership in one of Africa’s fastest growing cities and insights on how 
these groups have evolved in the urban context. With respect to the literature on urban 
disaster resilience, we unpack the pathways linking group membership and resilience. 
The findings suggest that savings groups contribute to resilience in urban areas. How-
ever, further research is necessary to explore whether these informal, trust-based institu-
tions can be successfully incorporated into urban resilience plans and actions.
This paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the “Background” 
section introduces the context and literature. After describing our methodology, the 
“Group Membership and Experience with Facing Floods” and “Savings Groups and 
Household Resilience to Flooding in Dar es Salaam” sections present our results on 
(1) the relationship between membership of savings groups and recovering from floods 
and (2) the savings group-level dynamics of solidarity and support in times of climate-
related disasters. The final section discusses the results against the broader debates in 
the field.
Background
With over 4.3 million inhabitants, Dar es Salaam is one of the largest cities in 
East Africa. Rapid urbanization has resulted in unplanned settlement in riverine 
and low-lying coastal areas, making significant areas of the city increasingly vul-
nerable to the effects of climate-related flooding (Collier & Jones, 2017; World 
Bank, 2009). An estimated 10% of Dar es Salaam’s inhabitants face repeated 
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direct impacts from floods, while another 39% are exposed indirect effects such as 
lost work, missed school, or adverse impacts on health (Erman, 2019).
The Government of Tanzania, along with the UK Department for International 
Development and the World Bank, have recently embarked on a project to enhance 
resilience to climate related disasters in Dar es Salaam and across the country 
through the Tanzania Urban Resilience Program (TURP). This program aims to 
strengthen emergency response coordination, build new infrastructure to reduce 
exposure to flooding, and develop community-level plans for disaster response 
and risk reduction. In conjunction with TURP, the Tanzanian government’s Dis-
aster Management Act of 2015 established Disaster Management Committees at 
regional, district, ward, and sub-ward/village levels. At present, however, the lower 
-level councils only exist on paper due to the government’s financial and capacity 
challenges. Similarly, under-resourced emergency services struggle to access many 
vulnerable communities due to poor infrastructure (Global Disaster Preparedness 
Center, 2019).
This leaves individual households as the main actors responsible for emergency pre-
paredness and response. Tanzanians have long relied on diverse networks of mutual 
aid to help pool valued resources and cover the contingencies of life (Abrahams, 1985; 
Maghimbi, 1995, 2010; Ruel, 1959). These “economies of affection” based on recip-
rocal relations among individuals to achieve collective ends have deep roots in the 
country and across the region (Hyden, 1980), though the forms they have taken have 
evolved over time. A decisive moment for the shaping of the savings groups was the 
contraction of formal employment during the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the consequences of which led to the further proliferation of mutual aid groups such as 
rotating credit associations, burial societies, handicraft groups, informal work groups, 
and market women associations (for further information on the history of mutual aid 
in Tanznaia, see Rodima-Taylor, 2012). There is no official data on the current extent 
of membership of savings groups in Dar es Salaam. However, it is clear that the model 
has rapidly spread in recent years. By 2016, there were an estimated nine million par-
ticipants in savings groups across Africa (le Polain et al., 2018).
Savings groups are a specific form of mutual aid. The model depends on 
regular, often weekly contributions from a self-selected and autonomous group 
that usually consists of between 15 and 30 members. Groups are predominantly, 
though not exclusively, made up of women. Indeed, because women are dispro-
portionately excluded from formal financial institutions, they are actively targeted 
by savings group programs (Rickard & Johnsson, 2018). Member contributions 
are kept in a central “pot,” often a physical cashbox that requires three separate 
keys. These keys are kept by different group members to ensure that opening and 
closings only occur in the presence of others. Members contribute to and bor-
row from this pot at each meeting. Interest is charged on the money lent, and 
the money accumulated through interest is shared among members at pre-defined 
intervals, usually after 1  year.1 Like tiny credit unions, savings groups provide 
members with highly localized banking services at negligible cost, all while 
1 The interest charged is typically low (around 5%) compared with formal lending institutions (between 
18 and 25%).
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keeping earnings and capital in communities that often struggle to gain access 
to formal financing. This includes Dar es Salaam, where financial markets are 
under-developed and interest rates are high. Without formally recognized prop-
erty rights and often surviving on irregular income flows, many poor people in 
the city simply lack the required collateral to access formal banking or micro-
credit institutions (CAHF, n.d.).
International NGOs such as CARE, Plan, Aga Khan, Catholic Relief Services, 
or Oxfam are routinely catalysts for the formation of savings groups. These provide 
nascent groups with an organizational template, a cashbox, and a limited period of 
technical training on group operations through local partners known as “Commu-
nity-Based Trainers” (CBTs)—though groups may opt to retain their CBTs beyond 
this period at their own expense. Two savings group models have become particu-
larly well established in Tanzania: the Village Savings and Loans Associations 
(VSLA) and the Village Community Banks (VICOBA) (Allen & Panetta, 2010). 
The present paper focuses on VICOBA, which happened to be more prevalent in 
the areas we studied. However, group members have significant scope to modify the 
rules of both VICOBA and VSLA models, making all groups adaptable to local con-
ditions and circumstances. Once established, savings groups are expected to register 
with the local ward authorities, though many groups opt to remain unregistered.
This highlights the ambiguous relationship that savings groups often have with the 
state. As informal institutions with rules that are largely created, communicated, and 
enforced internally, savings groups tend to operate beyond the reach of officially sanc-
tioned channels (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). This does not preclude the use of formal ele-
ments among groups. Though they require no legal infrastructure to either issue or collect 
loans, many groups adopt written constitutions outlining the rules on saving and borrow-
ing that have been agreed by members and—depending on whether the group has opted 
to register with the authorities—stored in the local ward office. Yet these rules are subject 
to informal evolution over time, often deviating considerably from the original NGO-led 
savings group template in the process (le Polain et al., 2018; Maliti, 2017). What is clear 
is that as informal institutions, savings groups are not competing with the state (Helmke 
& Levitsky, 2004). Instead, they are commonly providing either a substitutive option for 
individuals who would otherwise be excluded from formal financial institutions, or a 
complementary option for those who may have access to formal banking but also enjoy 
the collective dynamic of savings groups as a motivation for financial discipline (Collins, 
2009, 114). Indeed, rather than see them as poorly regulated and potential threating, both 
the state and the formal banking sector have tried to court savings groups for a number of 
reasons, whether to link them to state-backed insurance funds, use them as vehicles for 
political patronage, or simply to gain access to their capital (Bankable Frontier Associ-
ates, 2014; Maliti, 2017; Matthews et al., 2010; Stillman, 2018).
Methodology
In this paper, we provide new data on the extent of savings group membership and 
test the hypothesis that they are important for resilience by drawing together survey, 
interview, and focus group data. We use data from a household survey to measure 
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and explore patterns in membership and resilience, combined with qualitative data 
to explore the processes that link membership to resilience.
Definitions of resilience vary significantly across disciplines, leading to criticisms 
of conceptual vagueness and the attendant difficulties of measurement (Adger et al., 
2011). Moreover, the concept has also come under criticism for being used to absolve 
state actors of responsibility, or implying that a return to the status quo ex ante is 
desirable when there may be good reasons for wanting to transform certain systems 
or structures (Tanner et  al., 2017). As Leach (2008, 3) suggests, any discussion of 
resilience should be prefaced with the query “resilience of what, for whom?” As 
such, our understanding of resilience has a primarily social and local focus, one cen-
tered on the ability of individuals, groups, and institutions to withstand and recover 
from the impact of shocks and crises, particularly in the context of urban disaster 
(Adger, 2000, 347). This “bottom-up” emphasis follows from the empirical observa-
tion that local communities are key actors in disaster management, often mobilizing 
and responding to disruption faster than state agencies or governments. This does not 
imply that states or other actors should not play a critical role in disaster response, 
nor does it presume that savings groups are a panacea in the field of disaster risk 
reduction. Though our findings offer grounds for cautious optimism, it is important 
to note that in certain situations savings groups may conceivably contribute  to vul-
nerability: loans could result in unsustainable debt burdens, activities could instigate 
conflict between other group members or the broader community, or savings could be 
lost or stolen. These will be important factors to explore in future research.
The survey data comes from a Disaster-Poverty survey implemented over the course 
of 2017 and 2018, covering more than 1335 households in Dar es Salaam. It was imple-
mented by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) partner-
ship and the Poverty Global Practice at the World Bank, under the broader umbrella of 
the Tanzania Urban Resilience Program (TURP) (for further details, see Erman et al., 
2019). Working in collaboration with the Disaster-Poverty survey team, we designed 
two short questions on membership of mutual aid groups to be included in this survey: 
(1) “are you, or a member of your household, a member of a savings group or mutual 
aid group?” and (2) “if yes, does this group help you in the event of flood?” Three 
limitations to the approach should be kept in mind. First, the type of mutual aid group 
is unknown, it could be a savings groups (e.g., VICOBA or VSLA) or a rotating credit 
group (a key difference being that the latter does not charge interest). Second, the sur-
vey does not ask whether the household joined the group before or after a flood event. 
Third, we do not know how many groups the household may belong to.
The survey was sampled to be representative of Dar es Salaam as well as to pro-
vide coverage of households specifically living in flood-affected areas. It was imple-
mented over two time periods. In the first, 105 enumeration areas were selected 
using probability proportional to size (PPS) methods. In each, 10 households were 
then selected for interviewing. In the second round, 730 households were re-con-
tacted and 419 were re-interviewed, and an additional 282 households were added to 
the sample. In this analysis, we focus on flood events prior to 2018.
The qualitative data was collected over two rounds of research in Novem-
ber–December 2017 and in May 2019, as part of a broader study into socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of households living in flood-prone areas undertaken as part 
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of the Tanzania Urban Resilience Program. A total of 41 interviews and three focus 
group discussions were held with residents and local officials. Most were carried out 
in Swahili with the help of research assistants. Of these, 16 interviews and one focus 
group were specifically sampled to be members, leaders, and trainers of savings 
groups. We also analyzed 7 VICOBA constitutions and observed VICOBA training 
activities. All respondent names have been changed in this report for anonymity.
Group Membership and Experience with Facing Floods
One-quarter (24.1%) of the surveyed households had a member or members in at 
least one savings group. As shown in Table  1, compared to households without 
members in savings groups, households with members in savings groups tend to be 
larger, have more dependents, and are more likely to be connected to local associa-
tions. Their heads of household are, on average, a few years older, more likely to 
be migrants from other regions of Tanzania, less likely to be men, and better edu-
cated. They also appear better off as they live in houses that have more sleeping 
rooms (adjusted for household size) and are more likely to have access to electricity. 
Our measures for flood risk, however, are not significantly different between groups. 
Flood-prone areas do not appear more likely to see people join savings groups.
Because many of these socio-economic indicators are collinear, we ran a number 
of basic linear probability models with the different co-variates. This allows us to test 
which variables are significantly associated with group membership while controlling 
for a wide range of household characteristics. As Table 2 shows, many of the differ-
ences highlighted earlier do hold: households with members in savings groups are 
more likely be (1) headed by a woman, (2) wealthier, and (3) connected to a wider 
social network. The first correlation is likely linked to the long-standing and dispro-
portionate number of women as members of savings groups (Allen & Panetta, 2010). 
Similarly, the correlation with wealth is consistent with the fact that savings groups 
usually charge an entry fee (between 20,000 and 40,000 Tanzania Shillings) and 
require the ability to be able to save with regularity—typically, weekly or monthly.
The strongest correlation indicated above is between group membership and social 
network. Members of associations and social groups (that are not defined as savings 
groups) are 26% more likely to be members of savings groups. As sociologists have 
long documented, social capital often creates more social capital; people who are 
members of one organization are more likely to be a members of other organizations 
(Bourdieu, 1986). The data does not allow us to make any causal inference. Good social 
connections certainly help individuals approach (or create) a savings group. However, 
membership to a savings group may also be a way of introducing members to other 
groups and social circles. What matters here is to observe that members of savings 
groups are not only (slightly) better off financially, they are also better connected and 
therefore potentially better able to tap into a wider support group. In 70% of the cases, 
a savings group is only one of several organizations that members belong to. Savings 
groups do, however, appear to be particularly well placed among community groups to 
provide support, as we explain in the next section.
 A. Panman et al.
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Savings Groups and Household Resilience to Flooding in Dar es 
Salaam
Interview and focus group respondents indicated that savings groups provide mem-
bers with access to funds that can help them absorb, cope with, and recover from the 
impact of flooding. As expected, savings groups help their members save money, but 
they also provide them with access to extra funds to borrow, known as the “credit 
fund.” Many groups also have a “social fund” (or jamii) which acts as a form of 
insurance or emergency credit. Both are funded through regular equal contributions. 
Table 1  Socio-demographic characteristics, depending on whether the household counts one or multiple 
members who are part of a group
The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) is a government fund whose flagship activities include con-




*** < 0.01 | 1
Not in group In savings group Difference
Mean sd Mean sd (t test)+
Size of household 4.016 2.149 4.487 2.292 ***
Dependency ratio (children + elderly/adults) 2.056 1.341 2.411 1.482 **
Member of association/social group 0.328 0.470 0.701 0.459 ***
Has insurance 0.030 0.171 0.053 0.224
Benefits from TASAF (social protection)1 1.973 0.163 1.970 0.170
Head of household: age 44.101 14.486 46.452 13.081 **
Male 0.742 0.438 0.671 0.471 ***
No education 0.057 0.232 0.020 0.139 ***
Primary education 0.856 0.351 0.898 0.303 *
Secondary education 0.067 0.250 0.072 0.260
Tertiary education 0.019 0.138 0.010 0.099 ***
Has always lived in the district 0.569 0.495 0.625 0.485
Total years lived in the area 27.912 20.365 27.023 19.526
Has moved in from outside Dar es Salaam 0.181 0.386 0.171 0.377
Has moved in from Dar es Salaam 0.775 0.418 0.707 0.456 *
Number of bedrooms 1.127 1.006 1.015 0.742 *
Number of household items 2.130 1.329 2.704 1.432 ***
Simple toilet (pit) 0.445 0.497 0.329 0.471 ***
Upgraded latrine (pit) 0.326 0.469 0.332 0.472
Sanitized latrine 0.227 0.419 0.336 0.473 ***
Access to electricity 0.830 0.376 0.908 0.290 ***
Tenant 0.361 0.480 0.326 0.469
In area classified as high risk of flood 0.208 0.406 0.178 0.383
In area self-described as high risk of flood 0.230 0.421 0.276 0.448
In area that has been flooded 0.247 0.432 0.234 0.424
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Members decide in advance—and often codify in their group’s constitution—what 
these funds can be used for. Examples include weddings, childbirth, hospitaliza-
tion, and funerals, all contingencies of life that a range of similar informal insurance 
mechanisms have commonly covered in Tanzania (De Weerdt et al., 2007).
In theory, groups may be helping households smooth their consumption through 
savings, loans, or insurance pay-outs associated with membership. Our findings 
suggest that the latter two sources matter most in helping households cope with the 
impacts of floods. Savings are generally directed towards predictable annual expen-
ditures. As such, the pay-out cycle of savings groups is typically timed for Decem-
ber or January, between the two rainy seasons, to ensure that money is available for 
the holidays or for annual payment of school fees.
Table 2  Linear probability 
models explaining membership 
in groups
p value * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01
Beta s-error
Size of household 0.004 (0.007)
Dependency ratio (children + elderly/adults) 0.019* (0.009)
Member of association/social group 0.264*** (0.024)
Has insurance 0.033 (0.068)
Benefits from TASAF  − 0.070 (0.065)
Head of household: age 0.002 (0.001)
Male  − 0.077** (0.027)
No education 0.004 (0.087)
Primary education 0.116 (0.080)
Secondary education 0.103 (0.089)
Has always lived in the district 0.053 (0.049)
Total years lived in the area  − 0.001 (0.001)
Has moved in from outside Dar es Salaam  − 0.062 (0.040)
Has moved in from Dar es Salaam 0.006 (0.038)
Number of bedrooms  − 0.021 (0.012)
Number of household items 0.025** (0.009)
Simple toilet (pit)  − 0.121 (0.191)
Upgraded latrine (pit)  − 0.072 (0.191)
Sanitized latrine  − 0.084 (0.191)
Access to electricity 0.047 (0.029)
Tenant 0.011 (0.026)
In area classified as high risk of flood  − 0.062* (0.028)
In area self-described as high risk of flood 0.048 (0.028)
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The Social Fund
The social fund can play an important role in helping households manage the risks 
of flood, but we also find considerable variation in how this fund works. The insur-
ance mechanism is either set in advance and written into the group constitution or 
decided collectively during a group meeting. In the latter case, there can be more 
room to extend the coverage of insurance to adverse events that had not been strictly 
defined ahead of time or in a group’s constitution. The “pay-out” can take the form 
of a zero-interest loan, a pre-defined pay-out amount, or ad hoc contributions from 
other members. This variation is summarized in Table 3 below.
The social fund often acts as a form of insurance. When written in the group’s 
constitution and taking the form of either a loan or a “pay out” (cases A and B), the 
fund is regularly augmented by mandatory contributions from members, typically 
1000 TSh per week (but at times ranging up to 5000 TSh). In the event of a well-
defined adverse event, such as a death in the family, the claimant can expect either 
a pay-out or an interest-free loan (usually with a 6-month repayment period). The 
funds can be accessed almost immediately, and claimants may not have to wait until 
the next group meeting takes place to receive their compensation.
In some groups, there is no official social fund but ad hoc mandatory contribu-
tions that are written into the group constitution (case C above). As explained by 
one respondent, Esther, “VICOBA members contribute 2000 TSh as soon as a mem-
ber or a member’s relative is sick.” In these cases, as in cases where the pay-outs are 
not pre-defined, members must convene an emergency meeting or simply contact 
the group chairperson (e.g., cases D, E, and F in the table above). In some cases, the 
group’s president or other key members may be entitled to make executive emer-
gency decisions. This is the story Hassan told us. In his VICOBA, which gathers 
school friends from his ward and only meets monthly, it is possible to get a no-inter-
est loan of up to 300,000 TSh for “illness, death and other personal matters” (case 
D). The whole group normally decides on what these cases may be. However, in 
case of emergency, the chairperson and executive members can give the loan imme-
diately and announce it to the members at the next meeting.
Regardless of the structure used, the most common type of adverse event 
“insured” by group membership is the death of a relative (typically, parent, child, 
or in-law).2 In this respect, savings groups may be the institutional evolution of 
the funeral group-based funeral insurance described as “well placed as models to 
broaden insurance provision and other developmental activities” (Dercon et  al., 
2006, 685). Illness and the costs associated with hospitalization or medication are 
the second most common adverse events insured by savings groups.
Floods and other natural hazards are specifically covered by a limited number 
of groups. For instance, some savings group constitutions are specified in writ-
ing the amount of coverage available for flood-related damages. However, in most 
cases, such support is ad hoc (case F). Members must appeal to their group in these 
2 In the event of a group member’s death (whether from a flood or any other event), savings groups usu-
ally forgive debts and pass the accrued balance of savings and profits on to the deceased member’s stated 
beneficiary. Debts are typically not passed on to family members. Groups also support family members 
with non-financial contributions, such as participation in mourning and funeral arrangements.
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circumstances and they are not always successful in doing so. In one instance, a 
woman explained that her house was severely damaged by flooding, but her group 
decided not to support her financially, citing their small size and limited resources. 
The degree to which group members suffer from joint exposure may be a key limita-
tion to savings groups supporting those suffering from floods. After all, a commu-
nity-based insurance mechanism will not be viable if all community members are 
affected by the same event (Bhattamishra & Barrett, 2008).
Credit
Ultimately, it is access to credit that appears to be the most important source of 
financing to smooth consumption in the event of a disaster. This is not the original 
intent of the credit fund in the savings group model, which foresees lending to foster 
income-generating activity such as a small business investment. Indeed, lending for 
non-income-generating purposes may be an indication of “entropy,” or the gradual 
deviation from the group’s founding rules over time (Maliti, 2017; Matthews et al., 
2010). Increased reliance on non-income-generating loans can result in accumulat-
ing debt for members, given that loans must be repaid with interest (le Polain et al., 
2018). If these debt burdens become unmanageable, this could have a negative impact 
on the resilience of affected individual members, not to mention the entire group.
Yet if kept within manageable limits, opening up the opportunity to access 
emergency credit is an important element in mitigating the impact of flooding. In 
Dar es Salaam, we find that many groups had adapted their rules to allow mem-
bers to take out loans for non-income-generating activities. Members described 
using the money accrued through membership in order to move out of flood prone 
housing into safer accommodation. Community-based trainers demonstrated clear 
awareness that this was a deviation from the standard savings group model. As 
one of them explained:
When we started working in the community we saw that things were dif-
ferent, and we started to change what people can do with the money; for 
example, they can use it to pay rent, as long as they have another source of 
income or they record an asset – like a cupboard, fridge, radio, or television 
– that the group can sell if necessary
This adaptation in the rules to allow for the possibility of borrowing against the 
collateral of possessions such as a cupboard may give households an important 
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buffer against selling assets to cope with either short-term costs or lost income in 
the aftermath of a disaster.
Moreover, we find that members believe that loans, interest, and fines are less 
likely to be called in if the borrower has been hit by unforeseen event like flood 
or sickness. Indeed, members often described choosing to renegotiate repay-
ment schedules for members. Such flexibility was routinely highlighted as one of 
the key advantages of being a savings group member, as opposed to borrowing 
money via a bank or a mobile application such as M-Pesa. As one respondent, 
Esther, put it:
I used to get money from the bank, but the bank lacks a sense of human-
ity. There is no grace period if you are sick or have some other issue. With 
VICOBA it is different. Your group knows you; they are your neighbours, 
they understand.
Flexibility is important in situations where life is precarious, such as in flood 
prone areas of Dar es Salaam. Respondents were not worried about the greater 
risk of abuse engendered by this more flexible system. Group membership was 
seen to provide both the opportunity and information to evaluate whether mem-
bers are sincere and sanction them if necessary. Many stressed that as long as 
members continued to join regular meetings and participate in key group activi-
ties, then repayment periods could be renegotiated. As Grace, a community-based 
trainer who has trained 80 savings groups, explains:
Sometimes it happens that someone doesn’t repay a loan, but the group 
doesn’t chase them out. As long as they continue to attend group meetings 
and contribute to the group as normal, then the group will come to an agree-
ment about how to repay the money.
NGOs and members of savings groups stress the importance of relatively 
small group sizes, face-to-face interactions, reciprocal trust, and collective 
decision-making as central components to their effectiveness. These principles 
are well represented in the literature on collective action (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 
1990) and social capital (Platteau, 1994; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock & Narayan, 
2000). Or to put it in the language of our respondents, “everyone knows each 
other,” one person explained, “so it is difficult for someone to lie.” More research 
would be needed to identify the exact contours of such trust, but it does appear 
as a resource that is to some extent durable and accessible, at least slightly more 
so than in the ethnographic accounts of De Boek (2012) in Kinshasa and the 
more theoretical accounts of African cities of Simone (2004) that both describe 
trust and collective action as transient and primarily transactional. While it is 
clear that the savings groups are transactional in nature, and while regular inter-
action is described as central (see below), social interactions did not appear 
“constantly renegotiated” (De Boek, 2012) in savings groups. Rather, savings 
groups may provide a form of sheltering from such constant re-negotiations.
Of course, groups do sometimes break down, and the supply of trust is not 
infinite. One respondent highlighted that a former group collapsed when people 
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were unable to meet regularly, “people started losing hope and stopped sending 
money.” In other cases, they become too large to operate well. Members reported 
having a hard time refusing requests from additional people to join their group, 
and they sometimes reached as many as 50 members. To counter this, trainers 
explained that once a group reached 30 members, they encouraged the formation 
of new groups of at least 5 members under the supervision of leaders from the 
older group. Many groups were also organized in sub-groups of, typically, five 
individuals. Subgroup members act both as referees and as a close-knit support 
to each other in times of hardship.
Respondents also described innovations to safeguard the model. Besides fines 
for payment delays considered unwarranted, many groups explained that they 
pay community-based trainers or local government officials to act as the collec-
tors of debts from members who stopped attending the group (see Maliti, 2017 
for more details). Securing a form of collateral is frequent. In one ward, trainers 
were recommending that large loans be guaranteed by a relative, arguing that if 
there is ever an issue, “it will become a matter for the whole family, and they 
will all come to the office to resolve it.” For the same reason, in some areas, 
groups specified that members needed to have a family house in the area.
These accounts challenge existing ideas about savings groups. Rather than 
making groups unsustainable, changing practices in lending may reflect adapta-
tion to the highly precarious context of flood prone urban areas. Savings groups 
have adjusted their institutional structure in ways to ensure that they can scruti-
nize each other’s needs and sanction each-others behavior, should any member 
abuse the trust of the group. Ultimately, the appeal of savings groups come less 
from being a source of credit for those who cannot access banks, but rather as a 
source of financing for those whose incomes are highly vulnerable to shocks and 
thus consider the strictly defined repayment schedule of formal borrowing to be 
too risky.
Savings Groups and Community Response to Flooding in Dar es 
Salaam
In the survey data analysis, we highlighted that savings groups likely extend social 
networks. We now turn to the relationship between the social dimension of savings 
group membership and responses to flooding. The interviews reveal that savings 
groups often serve to enhance collective action, such as charitable work in response 
to floods. More generally, they seem to support the idea that members of savings 
groups could become agents for change to support preventative action against floods.
The Benefits of Savings Group Networks
Group membership helps people maintain social networks of support under the pres-
sures of urban life. New members are typically close relations to at least one exist-
ing member, such as friends, schoolmates, family, work colleagues or people in the 
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same trade, or neighbors. In a number of cases, membership criteria pointed to a 
desire of members to maintain connections that may otherwise become weaker over 
time (e.g., schoolmates or people who had all lived in the same neighborhood). This 
may be important because research suggests that weakening social ties and severed 
networks of mutual aid are sufficiently large—and often overlooked—“costs” to 
relocating out of precarious or “slum” areas that ultimately may undermine reset-
tlement efforts (Barnhardt et  al., 2017). Respondents routinely cited the strong 
bonds generated by their groups as a key part of what makes participating in savings 
groups worthwhile.
We also find that members also expand their networks through group participa-
tion. Indeed, members also join through acquaintances or other weak ties, which 
productively extend pre-existing networks of support. One respondent recalled join-
ing her VICOBA through “The sister of my best friend who had asked her whether 
she knew anyone who wanted to join [a savings group].” She now talks of her previ-
ously unknown fellow group members with affection: “We are relatives, we speak 
one language.” This has important implications for resilience. Wider social networks 
mean that people can draw on more varied sources of support during floods.
Our respondents clearly anticipated the usefulness of such networks. They men-
tioned groups as good for finding employment opportunities, decent housing, but 
even more frequently help in times of crisis. Many interviewees recounted how fol-
lowing flood events, they helped other members with food, shelter, or even paid their 
rent at a temporary location. They all stressed that it was not financially motivated: 
“We gave it for free” on person said, while others added “We did it out of love” and 
“If one has problems, you must help each other.” Such help is often in the form of 
cash, but labor, food, and shelter are sometimes also provided. In one case, a group 
drew upon its social fund to purchase sandbags for a house in danger, but it was 
the members’ voluntary labor to fill and place the bags that was crucial. Similarly, 
another respondent explained that group members helped during evacuation, along-
side with friends, family, and neighbors.
Savings group networks also support resilience through knowledge sharing. Inter-
view respondents routinely emphasized that participation in savings groups helped 
members develop financial literacy. The chairperson of one group explained that he 
helped start a VICOBA group for youth so that young people would learn from an 
early age about concepts related to saving, investment, and the basic actuarial skills 
of calculating interest. Others emphasized the informal business-related knowledge 
they received from their groups, covering issues from marketing to entrepreneur-
ship. With regard to floods, participants spoke of the weekly meetings as an oppor-
tunity to discuss something they may have heard on the news or the radio, such as 
weather warnings or flood reports. Group members also reported using mobile mes-
saging services, such as WhatsApp or text messages, to share information about bad 
weather.
In some contexts, savings groups have been found to engage in collective enter-
prises that help to mitigate disaster risks, but we found little evidence of this in Dar 
es Salaam. In Uganda, for example, savings groups collectively purchased solar 
lamps, because the open flame of older kerosene lamps was deemed an emergency 
risk (Allen & Panetta, 2010). In Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Mali, savings groups have 
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also invested in joint income generating activities beyond the group’s core objec-
tives of lending money (Maliti, 2017). Yet we found that only a limited number of 
respondents said that their group was actively engaged in collective business ven-
tures. Many said they had heard of groups that ran collectively owned farms or 
shops, but most of the groups we met did not run a collective enterprise and did not 
intend to do so. At most, some appeared to pool resources to purchase goods (e.g., 
soap, batik) wholesale to distribute among members.
Beyond Members’ Direct Benefits
In contrast, we did find widespread evidence that groups often saw charity as a 
central part of their objectives. Most groups said that their members make small 
financial and non-financial contributions to charitable activities. These are generally 
focused on helping members of their local community, though at times they extend 
into other areas of the city as well. Where the charity activity involved financial con-
tributions, the sums of money contributed are small compared with the savings and 
loans. For example, where the donation is a one-off annual contribution, members of 
a group that makes weekly 2000 TSh minimum share contributions described mem-
bers annually putting 5000 TSh towards charity. In one ward, however, trainers were 
encouraging groups to set up a separate fund called the “Children’s Fund” for dedi-
cated charitable activities, in addition to the standard share and emergency funds. 
In these cases, contributions were proportionally larger: 500 TSh per week, next to 
a 2000 TSh minimum share amount. Many also described engaging in non-finan-
cial forms of charity. In one case, it was described as a condition of membership 
that you be “Willing to visit patients in hospital or other similar activities with us.” 
These events may also be actively encouraged by trainers and a means to spread the 
word about savings groups, as trainers receive financial pay-outs from forming new 
groups (either in the form of fees or a share of end-of-cycle profits). Some respond-
ents explained that they first heard about VICOBA from a charity event.
Most respondents had examples of groups spontaneously deciding to help in the 
event of floods. One described how, in 2017, their group had paid to replace sta-
tionery and school uniforms washed away by the floods for a number of children in 
the community. Another explained that last year, they had gone to distribute food in 
an area outside of their neighborhood that had been badly hit by the flood. This has 
also been recorded by researchers in Burundi, who note that members of savings 
groups responded to floods by providing financial assistance to impacted families 
(Entz et al., 2016, 25).
Membership of savings groups appears to strengthen and expand individual 
social networks, providing new coping mechanisms during floods. They also con-
stitute a vehicle for engagement in local voluntary activities that benefit the wider 
community. However, we encountered few instances of groups taking preventative 
actions to help mitigate risks of flooding in their neighborhoods. For example, one 
group mentioned that they had collectively engaged in cleaning up a blocked drain 
in response to financial incentives from the government. Yet, when asked whether 
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they would continue cleaning the drain once the incentives had stopped, the group 
expressed reluctance: “You just know that the rains will come back and we will be 
badly hit again.” Cleaning drains was perceived as only marginally effective in pro-
tecting neighborhoods from flood.
Discussion and Conclusions
Widely hailed as a means to improve access to finance and support entrepreneuri-
alism among unbanked households, savings groups have proliferated across Africa 
since the early 1990s. In this paper, we argue that savings groups may also play an 
important role in supporting resilience to floods. Importantly, this effect is not only 
the result of improved access to funds; it also reflects the role that groups play in 
sustaining strong social bonds, which means that they can be more flexible in pro-
viding finance and may help to overcome key barriers to cooperative action in urban 
communities. While our research departs from more ethnographic accounts of infor-
mal and precarious urban economies and infrastructures (Simone, 2004), we share 
the idea that at the core of savings groups are the re-assembling and re-configuration 
of collective action (Chalfin, 2017). What savings groups may provide is a space for 
collective action that is more successful and stable than other “community building” 
efforts precisely because it is articulated around “developing the real skills that they 
need to survive” (Simone, 2004, 420). Membership in savings groups are not driven 
by vague notions of community building, but rather from clear economic interests.
The savings group model was developed with the expectation that it can improve 
a household’s capacity to save and access loans for business opportunities. In 
many instances, they also provide some form of insurance against adverse circum-
stances, such as a death of a relative. Our findings bring more nuance to the debate 
on the sustainability of savings groups. Such sustainability is typically described as 
depending on a number of key factors. For one, the interest rate mechanism means 
that lending should follow a clear business logic motivated by profitable returns; 
otherwise, there is a risk that households may become overly indebted (le Polain 
et al., 2018). For another, funds should be directed according to the strength and fea-
sibility of the business case, rather than social ties (Matthews et al., 2010). In addi-
tion to this, groups may struggle to “insure” events that many members are simul-
taneously exposed to (Bhattamishra & Barrett, 2008). In Dar es Salaam, we find a 
number of variations in the way that groups function which, on the surface, may 
threaten group sustainability. Lending rules have been widely adapted to allow for 
borrowing for non-business-related activities. Repayment schedules are often rene-
gotiated. Groups make ad hoc pay-outs to members in times of need. While there 
are undoubtedly groups that do collapse, we find that most respondents were very 
confident about their capacity to scrutinize other members and ensure that people 
did not abuse the group. This was largely the result of strict rules on attendance at 
meetings and mutual engagement, backed up by sanctioning through fines and even 
the use of enforcers.
These results suggest that the group structure can be an effective means to over-
come monitoring and sanctioning challenges that often undermine cooperative 
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problem solving in urban areas. In these cases, it becomes a form of flexible finance 
that may be particularly well suited for precarious environments, such as flood prone 
areas of cities. Indeed, the flexibility of lending that results from membership of 
savings groups, as well as the speed with which funds can be disbursed, may make 
them—according to our research participants—a preferable form of finance to more 
formal channels for low-income and vulnerable households, or even to recent forms 
of micro-lending through mobile phone companies (such as M-Pesa) that are more 
creative in dealing with collateral but remain rigid in terms of repayment. In addi-
tion to this, the results suggest that the group membership structures may have wider 
benefits for community resilience. We see a relationship between group membership 
and size of social networks, and respondents often highlighted this as a benefit of 
membership. Members express a strong sense of group identity and belonging, and, 
thanks to their frequent meetings and emphasis on skills, knowledge, and informa-
tion, savings groups are well-positioned social nodes through which issues related to 
disaster prevention and response may be communicated.
The flexibility through which savings groups work to increase resilience mean 
that the “formalization” of these informal institutions may have adverse outcomes. 
The strength of savings groups has been to develop and adjust to very localized cir-
cumstances. While linking groups to formal financial institutions or bringing them 
under greater oversight and direction from the state may be seen as entailing greater 
stability, there is a risk that any hardening of informal borrowing and gifting rules 
may weaken the role that groups play in flood resilience. Similarly, formalization 
through linking groups to state agencies, as it has been suggested by some during 
our research, may introduce a vertical dimension into the otherwise horizontal social 
networks that form the bedrock of saving group structures. As a consequence, trust-
based “economies of affection,” as Goran Hyden notes, may become increasingly 
susceptible to clientelism, possibly compromising the sustainability of groups in the 
process (Hyden, 2005, 89). There is some evidence to date of local political actors 
in Tanzania seeking to use patronage to savings groups to leverage political influ-
ence (Maliti, 2017). Any effort to “scale up” savings groups as a model of improved 
flood resilience—whether in Tanzania’s specific political context or beyond—will 
need to be attentive to the complex relationships between national elites, local politi-
cal actors, and savings groups. The risk is that the engineering of savings groups by 
state or aid actors merely leads to nice-looking but empty shells, with clear rules and 
connections to state agencies but very little of the adaptiveness and reactivity that is 
the real strength of savings groups.
Finally, there is significant scope for further research to better understand the 
relationships between savings groups and resilience. Our results raise at least three 
potential lines of inquiry. First, more work is necessary to understand what makes 
savings groups succeed or fail in urban disaster-prone contexts such as Dar es 
Salaam, and in particular in relationship with their membership. Second, the appar-
ent lack of preventative action among members of savings groups to mitigate the 
effects of flood is striking. Here, the need is to understand the interplay between sav-
ings groups, knowledge about the effectiveness of preventative actions, and the for-
mal mechanisms that the government has established, such as community disaster 
preparedness and response plans. Finally, more work needs to be done to better 
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understand the role of gender in the formation of saving groups, as well as the role 
savings groups may play in shaping gender roles. Savings groups are predominantly 
made up of women, a fact that some studies suggest has had a positive impact on 
female empowerment (Karlan et al., 2017). Yet literature on the gendered impacts of 
natural disasters consistently highlights how poor women—the same demographic 
targeted by savings group programs—are both disproportionately affected by disas-
ters and have a more difficult time recovering from them (Enarson et al., 2006; Neu-
mayer & Plümper, 2007). Understanding the specifically gendered interplay between 
membership of savings groups and disaster will be an important element of future 
research.
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